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I den här artikeln skattas effekten på fertiliteten av förändringar i åldersstrukturen. Få 
faktorer är så oskiljaktiga från ekonomiska och demografiska teorier om underutveckling 
som höga födelsetal.Större delen av den empiriska litteraturen om fertilitet fokuserar på 
en några få traditionellt antagna bestämningsfaktorer: inkomster, mäns och kvinnors 
utbildning, spädbarnsdödlighet och landsbygdens befolkningsandel. Mera nyligen har 
Macunovich utvecklat Easterlins idéer om åldersstrukturens potentiella påverkan på 
fertiliteten och gett empiriska belägg för dess effekter. Vi följer upp Macunovichs bidrag 
genom: 
(1) Estimation av fertilitetsekvationer i vilka åldersstrukturen och de traditionella 
bestämningsfaktorerna ingår samtidigt. Detta kan tolkas som en test av 
robustheten för en del av variablerna då man kontrollerar för de övriga. Eller 
också kan det tolkas som ett test av hypoteser rörande mekanismerna bakom 
variablernas påverkan på fertiliteten  
(2) Test av kohortstorlekseffekternas likhet over kontinenterna och mellan 
utvecklade regioner och utvecklingsregioner.. 
(3) Test av den aspekt av mekanismen varigenom kohortstorlek antas påverka 
fertiliteten: genom kvinnors arbetskraftsdeltagande. 
För att uppnå dessa målsättningar har vi ekonometriskt skattat en statisk 
panelregression med aggregerade paneldata för 90 utvecklade länder och 
utvecklingsländer observerade vart femte år over perioden 1950 till 1995. Vi finner att: 
(1)  Åldersstruktureffekterna går i den antagna riktningen. De är anmärkningsvärt 
stora och mycket precist skattade även efter kontroll för alla viktigare 
alternative bestämningsfaktorer för fertiliteten. Kohortstorleken har starka 
effekter som är oberoende av effekterna från inkomst, mäns och kvinnors 
arbetskraftsdeltagande, deras utbildning, landsbygdsandelen av 
befolkningen och spädbarnsdödligheten. 
(2)  Kohortstorlekseffekterna  återfinns på alla kontinenter såväl inom den 
utvecklade världen som i utvecklingsregionerna. Storleksordningen är 
anmärkningsvärt homogen over både kontinenter och utvecklingsnivå. Av 
alla de variabler som inkluderats i regressionsekvationerna är kohortstorlek 
den enda som genomgående har en stor och signifikant effekt över alla 
regioner. 
(3)  Estimaten av kohortstorlekseffekterna överlever kontroll för kvinnors 
arbetsmarknadsaktivitet. Det betyder att effekterna kommer från någon 
mekanism utöver kvinnors arbetskraftsutbud (och även utöver de andra 
effekter som specifikationen kontrollerar för). Vi är därför fortfarande i behov 
av en empiriskt giltig teori för orsaken till att kohortstorlek har en negativ 
effekt på fertiliteten.  I.  Summary 
 
This paper estimates the effect of changes in population age structure on fertility.  Few 
factors are as inseparable from economic and demographic theories of 
underdevelopment as high fertility rates.  Most of the empirical literature on fertility 
focuses on a small set of traditionally hypothesized determinants: incomes, men’s and 
women’s education, infant mortality, and the rural share of the population.  More 
recently, Macunovich develops ideas by Easterlin about the potential impact of 
population age structure on fertility, and provides empirical evidence for its effects.  We 
continue along the lines of Macunovich’s contribution by: 
(4) Estimating fertility equations in which age structure and the traditional 
determinants are included simultaneously.  This may be interpreted as a test 
of robustness of one set of variables when controlling for the others.  Or it 
may be interpreted as a test of hypotheses concerning the mechanisms 
whereby one set of variables affects fertility.   
(5) Testing for the consistency of cohort size effects across continents and 
between the developing and developed regions 
(6) Testing one aspect of the mechanism whereby cohort size is hypothesized to 
affect fertility, through women’s labor force participation. 
To accomplish these objectives, we econometrically estimate a static panel equation 
using aggregate panel data on the relevant variables for 90 developed and developing 
countries observed every 5 years over the period from 1950 to 1995.  We find that: 
(4)  Age structure effects are found in the hypothesized direction.  They are 
remarkably large and very precisely estimated even after controlling for all 
the major competing determinants of fertility.  Thus cohort size has strong 
effects that are independent of the effects of income, men’s and women’s 
labor force participation rates, men’s and women’s education, rurality, and 
infant mortality. 
(5)  Cohort size effects are found in every continent within the developing world, 
as well as in the developed world.  Their magnitudes are remarkably similar 
across continents and levels of development.  Of all the variables included in 
the regressions, cohort size has the most consistently large and significant 
effect across all regions. 
(6)  The estimates of cohort size effects survive controlling for women’s 
economic activity rates.  This means that cohort size effects are mediated by 
more than women’s labor supply (and by more than all other effects 
controlled for in the specification).  We are still in need of an empirically 
validated theory of why cohort size has a negative effect on fertility. 
 II. Introduction 
 
In economic and demographic theories, as well as in the popular consciousness, few 
factors are as inseparable from underdevelopment as high fertility rates.  The 
relationship between the two is complex and reflects mutual causation.  The most 
powerfully resonant ideas, flowing from Malthus’s (1798) original grand pessimistic 
vision, are about the impact of high fertility on underdevelopment.  Population growth 
brought about by high fertility always threatens to exceed the rate at which the food 
supply grows.  Recurrent famines and starvation shrink the population and lower fertility, 
and are the essential mechanism whereby growth in populations and food supplies are 
reconciled.   This vision of fertility-led population growth in constant tension with 
development echoes powerfully in modern times, in alarmist works such as Ehrlich 
(1968), but also in the less extreme economic and demographic models.  For example, 
the standard Solow (1956) model of economic growth predicts that while long-term 
growth in standards of living are independent of the rate of population growth, increases 
in this rate cause permanently lower levels of output and consumption per capita.   
 
On the other hand, it is also widely understood that development has an impact on 
fertility.  Within economics, the most famous exposition of this idea comes from Becker 
(1960), and Becker and Tomes (1976).  There are two components to this idea.  The first 
element has to do with rising women’s wages which is itself the result of rising women’s 
education.  As women’s wages rise, the income that must be foregone by women in 
order to perform time-intensive child-rearing grows larger, making high fertility less 
attractive. The substitution effect of this opportunity cost runs opposite and may 
dominate the income effect of higher wages on the number of desired children.  In 
contrast, growth in the male wage is usually believed to exert only a positive income 
effect on fertility since men traditionally do little child rearing.  The second element has to 
do with rising demand for child quality as household income rises.  If this demand rises 
strongly enough, households will prefer to raise fewer children of higher quality, rather 
than more children of lower quality as their incomes grow.  Expenditures on children can 
rise as a function of income, as is required if children are a normal good, even if the 
number of children falls as long as the quality of children rises fast enough.  Other 
theories emphasize the role of processes that accompany modernization.  For example, 
demographic transition theories predict a role for infant and child mortality reductions in 
bringing down fertility since fewer births are needed to attain a target number of 
surviving children.  Urbanization reduces the possibilities for using children as unpaid 
agriculture, as well as provides new state-run mechanisms for providing old age security, 
obviating the need for depending on offspring for productive household labor or 
retirement income. 
 
Clearly then, the relationship between fertility and development is one of mutual 
causation, and some theories are very explicit about these interactions.  For example, in 
some microeconomic theories of development (Basu and Van 1998, Bardhan and Udry 
1999), parents’ fertility choices are determined simultaneously with prospective 
decisions concerning their children’s schooling and labor.  In these theories, multiple 
equilibria are possible: one characterized by low fertility, high human capital 
accumulation, and low child labor, and the other by high fertility, low human capital, and 
high child labor.  History, social norms, expectations, or exogenous shocks usually 
determine which equilibrium results, but in either equilibrium, fertility and the human 
capital outcomes which are essential for development are determined simultaneously.  
 Not all theories imply a negative relationship between population growth and 
development.  A small number of writers, most prominently Kuznets (1960, 1967) and 
Simon (1981) argue that population growth enlarges the stock of human ingenuity as 
well as facilitates the exploitation of economies of scale.  Simon invokes as evidence of 
this the long term tendency of natural resource prices to fall rather than rise as might be 
predicted in a Malthusian world.  In a twist of the Malthusian theme, Ester Boserup 
(1965, 1981) argues that the adversity caused when population growth threatens to 
outstrip food and resource supplies can promote innovation which resolves the 
adversity.  This is how, she argues, hunting and gathering became replaced by slash 
and burn agriculture, which was in turn replaced by multi-annual cropping.  And yet, on 
the whole, most theories predict a negative relationship between fertility and 
development. 
 
In the past two decades, a more nuanced view emerged in which the relationship 
between population dynamics and development was mediated by more than sheer 
population growth rates and population sizes.  Special attention was paid to the role of 
age-structure changes produced by the demographic transition.  According to a 
representative version of this view (see Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003), the 
demographic transition begins with a decline in infant and child mortality due to the 
diffusion of new treatments for disease, public health infrastructure, and hygienic 
behavior.  This reduced mortality eventually induces a response of lowered fertility.  In 
the interval between the mortality decline and the fertility response, a baby boom cohort 
is created.  The life trajectory of this boom cohort yields distinctive challenges and 
opportunities for development.  Early on, the cohort produces a higher than average 
youth dependency ratio, producing demands that could potentially strain educational 
systems and household resources.  But when this cohort grows into adulthood, it 
becomes the source of a potential demographic dividend by boosting a nation’s labor 
supply, consumption demand, and pool of savings, all potentially aiding growth.  And 
finally, when this cohort ages, it produces potential strains on systems of social support 
for the elderly. 
 
Thus fertility, by being one of the main forces driving population growth and age 
structure, is inseparable from socio-economic development.  The latter half of the 20
th 
century saw many changes in levels of fertility and development across the globe.  In 
most regions, there were dramatic improvements in both, though in Africa, there was 
very little progress.  The developing nations of Asia (excluding Japan and South Korea 
which are considered part of the developed world in this paper) tripled its average 
national per capita output from $1135 in 1950 to $3350 in 1995 (in constant 1996 
dollars).  In that same time it reduced its total fertility rate from 6.1 to 3.7.  The developed 
nations more than tripled its income from $6500 to $20,800 and almost halved its fertility 
rate from 2.9 to 1.6 over that same period.  Latin America and the Caribbean showed 
less dramatic improvement.  Per capita incomes only rose by about two-thirds from 
$3000 to $5200, though fertility halved from 6 to 3.  Progress was slowest in Africa, 
where income grew by only about 30% from $1700 to $2200, and fertility fell by one from 
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Figure 1.  TFR and Per Capita GDP
 
 
Yet fertility remains high in many areas.  It is still barely below 6 in Africa.  And while 
Asia and Latin America have seen drastic declines, their fertility rates are still between 3 
and 4, well above replacement levels.  On the other hand, the challenges of economic 
development remain daunting.  On average, figure 1 shows that the developing world is 
experiencing living standards considerably below those enjoyed by the developed 
nations half a century ago.  African standards of living are about one-tenth those of the 
wealthiest countries.  Future fertility reductions, especially in Africa, will almost certainly 
play a role in future development prospects. 
 
Because of the role that fertility plays in development, both past and future, an 
understanding of its determinants remains important.  On the issue of the empirical 
determinants of fertility, there is a large amount of research.  For a recent summary, see 
Bulatao and Casterline (2001).  We have already alluded to its central ideas.  Women’s 
education tends to lower fertility while men’s education tends to raise it.  Income growth 
tends to raise the demand for quality at the expense of quantity of children.  Infant 
mortality declines reduce fertility by reducing the replacement motive.  And urbanization 
tends to reduce fertility by lowering the possibilities for using children as agricultural 
labor, and by facilitating the use of formal social security systems rather than within-
household intergenerational transfers for retirement income for the elderly. 
 
More recently, Macunovich (2000) develops and provides evidence for an original idea 
by Easterlin (1978) that age structure, more specifically, relative cohort size (RCS) 
should have a negative effect on the total fertility rate (TFR).  The essential mechanism 
is a combination of cohort crowding and relative income aspirations.  The demographic 
transition creates large cohorts of young males that, upon entering the labor market, 
experiences lower wages because of their abundance and imperfect substitutability for 
older more experienced workers.  The lower wages could result in lower participation rates as they fall below reservation levels.  On the other hand, if young males have 
relative income targets because they aspire to the standard of living enjoyed by their 
parents, then the lower wages may cause them to increase their labor supply and 
participation.  Thus, the effect of relative cohort size on male participation is ambiguous.  
However, we would expect that male participation should have a positive effect on 
fertility for the same kind of income effect reasons that male education has a positive 
effect on fertility. On the other hand, it is argued that women’s labor force participation 
will rise, largely due to the relative income motive.  The combination of higher women’s 
participation and the expensiveness of children in the light of the younger generation’s 
relative poverty lead to lower fertility.  Macunovich (2000) provides evidence for this 
cohort size effect, using cross-country panel regressions in which the independent 
variables are levels and changes in RCS, lagged TFR, and infant mortality, and finds 
significant effects in the hypothesized directions.   
 
It is remarkable how little of the literature on fertility determinants has been influenced by 
the age structure hypothesis.  None of the studies in Bulatao and Casterline (2001) 
mention age structure, and none of the cross country empirical work on fertility 
determinants (with the exception of Macunovitch’s) includes age structure as an 
independent variable.  Yet if age structure does have an effect, it would clearly be 
important to integrate it into models of fertility determinants.  Many of the traditional 
determinants of fertility such as income, education, and the labor force participation of 
women are variables that have been theorized to themselves be functions of age 
structure (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2003, Easterlin 1978, Macunovich 1996).  A 
better understanding of the roles of these determinants will be made possible by seeing 
what their residual effects on fertility are, once age structure has been taken into 
account.  On the other hand, if an age structure effect exists, we would come to a 
deeper understanding of the precise mechanism through which this effect is realized if 
we estimate age structure effects in a model that includes both the traditional variables 
and the hypothesized variable that mediates the age structure effects, women’s labor 
force participation.  Macunovitch’s work itself, while providing evidence for age structure 
effects, does not include any of the other traditional determinants of fertility.  We are thus 
unable to tell the importance of age structure effects when controlling for other 
determinants. 
 
We therefore estimate a static panel equation in which the dependent variable is the 
total fertility rate, and the independent variables are the traditional determinants of 
fertility, the relative cohort size of reproductive age women, and the labor force 
participation of women and men.  Because it has been argued that the relationship 
between the independent variables and fertility may vary by region and level of 
development (Bulatao and Casterline 2001), we estimate regressions on a pooled 
sample of countries as well as by region.  We use four regions: the OECD, the 
developing Asian countries, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.  This 





Data on TFR, RCS, and IMR are obtained from the United Nations World Population 
Prospects 2000 (United Nations 2002).  RCS is taken to be the share of the population 
aged 15-34 in the adult population aged 15-64 calculated from this dataset.  Per capita 
GDP is measured using the variable RGDPCH from the Penn World Tables 6.0 (Heston and Summers 1994).  Total years of schooling in the adult population aged 15 and 
above for males and females are measured using the variables TYRM15 and TYRF15 
from Barro and Lee (2000).  The rural share of the population is obtained from the World 
Development Indicators 2002 (World Bank 2003).   
 
Data on male and female economic activity is taken from the fourth edition of the ILO’s 
Economically Active Populations dataset (International Labour Office 1997) which 
contains data on the age and sex composition of total and economically active 
populations for the world’s countries during the years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990.  
The data source defines the economically active as “all persons of either sex who furnish 
the supply of labour for the production of economic goods and services as defined by the 
United Nations system of national accounts and balances during a specified time-
reference period.  According to these systems the production of economic goods and 
services includes all production and processing of primary products whether for the 
market, for barter or for own consumption, the production of all other goods and services 
for the market and, in the case of households which produce such goods and services 
for the market, the corresponding production for own consumption….By that definition, 
the active population includes: persons in ‘paid’ or ‘unpaid’ employment, members of the 
armed forces (including temporary members) and the unemployed (including first time 
job-seekers.”  Unpaid employment itself includes “Employers, own-account workers and 
members of producers’ cooperatives; unpaid family workers, persons engaged in the 
production of economic goods and services for own and household consumption, and 
apprentices who receive pay.”  Since household production for own use counts as 
economic activity only for primary goods and for all other goods and services also 
supplied to the market, household maintenance activities like child-care and 
housekeeping do not count as economic activity.  Economic activity as defined by the 
ILO is therefore broadly similar to the concepts of “labor force participation” and “labor 
supply”. 
 
The benchmark data for the activity rates are obtained from the third edition of the EAP 
dataset for the years 1950, 1960, and 1970, and from population censuses, sample 
surveys of the economically active, or similar surveys conducted from 1974 to 1994 and 
published by national and international statistical agencies for the years 1980 and 1990.  
These baseline data are adjusted using what the ILO calls a “pragmatic” approach 
“(where) choice of methods and techniques for estimating activity rates…was based on 
an evaluation of…criteria pertaining to the source and quality of the data and to national 
data compilation practices….Whenever…data…was unavailable, the rule was to draw 
on information or data on countries…at a similar level of socio-economic and cultural 
development.”  Most adjustments of baseline data were performed to harmonize 
definitions of the economically active, as well as to raise the activity rates of women in 
agriculture who worked as unpaid family workers.  These rates seemed “deliberately 
overlooked…for socio-cultural reasons, or…under-enumerated by comparison with data 
from neighboring countries with the same socio-economic profiles.  Fuller details of data 
construction methodology and country-by-country details can be obtained from ILO 
(2000).  Summary statistics of the data are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Summary statistics of the data 
Variable Nobs  Mean  S.D. 
TFR 334  4.6  2.02 
RCS aged 15-34  334  0.57  0.07 
MAR aged 15-34  334  83.8  5.6 FAR aged 15-34  334  49.5  19.5 
RGDPCH 334  5782  5893 
Rural share  334  55.3  24.7 
Years of school, f  334  4.1  2.9 
Years of school, m  334  4.9  2.7 




Our specification regresses the total fertility ratetfr  on the following independent 
variables: 
 
1. The age structure variable   which equals the number of adults aged 15-34 as 
a fraction of the number of total working-aged adults aged 15-64. 
34 15− RCS
 
2. The activity rate or labor force participation rates of females and males aged 15-34, 
denoted   and 
34 15− FAR
34 15− MAR  respectively. 
 
3. The log of per capita output  ( ) rgdpch log . 
 
4. The proportion of the population that is rural  .  rshare
 
5. The total years of schooling of the female and male population older than 15 years of 
age denoted by   and   respectively.  15 tyrf 15 tyrm
 
6. The log of the infant mortality rate  ( ) imr log  
 
7. Country and period fixed effects µ  and v 
 
8. An error term ε  
 
Countries and years are indexed by ( ) t i,  respectively.  The regression specification is: 
 
( )
() it t i it it it
it it it it
v imr tyrm tyrf
rshare rgdpch MAR FAR RCS tfr
ε µ β β β
β β β β β
+ + + + + +













The double linear functional form was chosen using the method of quasi-R-squares, 
which showed that the linlin and linlog forms do equally well relative to the loglin and 
loglog forms.  We estimate the basic specification separately for each of the four 
regions, and then pool all regions together.  Table 2 shows the results. 
 Table 2.  Regression results 
 Asia  Africa  Latin 
America 
OECD Pooled 


















































































55 101  87  91  334 
Number of 
countries 












To make the estimates of the cohort size effects easier to interpret, the last row of this 
table transforms the coefficients of RCS into their corresponding elasticities.  We draw 
the following four lessons from these regressions.  First, there is a uniformly strong 
relationship between relative cohort size and fertility.  This relationship exists across 
continents and levels of development, and is quite precisely estimated as seen from the 
high levels of statistical significance.  The magnitudes of the elasticities are also 
consistently above 1.  Thus, relative cohort size must be considered an important 
correlate if not determinant of fertility in every region of the world regardless of level of 
development.  Second, every independent variable other than relative cohort size has 
only an inconsistently significant relationship with fertility.  For example, male and female 
activity rates, women’s education, rural share of the population, and infant mortality are 
statistically significant in only two out of four continents, while income and male 
education are significant in only one out of the four continents.  Third, where the 
traditional independent variables are significant, they do have the expected sign.  That 
is, we see that male activity rates, male education, rural population share, and infant 
mortality are positively correlated with fertility while female activity, female education, 
and income are negatively correlated with fertility.  Fourth, and perhaps most relevant for 
the assessment of the Easterlin/Macunovich hypothesis regarding the mechanism 
whereby cohort size affects fertility, we see that the significant effect of cohort size on 
fertility survives the inclusion of the female activity rate.   
 
This table reproduces many of the other findings in other empirical work: the inconsistent 
effect of income, the negative and positive effects of female and male schooling 
respectively, the positive association between mortality and fertility.  But what we find remarkable is the strength and statistical significance of the effects of cohort size in the 
presence of these competing determinants.  Thus we can make an even stronger claim 
than Macunovich, that relative cohort size exerts its strong negative effect on fertility, 
even after controlling for most of the other hypothesized determinants of fertility.  There 
are two possible interpretations of this significance.  First, that the effect of cohort size is 
quite robust to the inclusion of controls.  And second, that the effect of cohort size is not 
completely mediated through these controls.  In particular, we find that the theoretical 
argument for a cohort size effect working through women’s work is insufficient: women’s 
work itself is not consistently associated with fertility, and the impact of cohort size on 
fertility does not disappear in the presence of control for women’s work. 
 
This leads us to another conclusion.   Most traditional analyses of fertility determinants 
that focus on the other factors such as income, education, and infant mortality usually 
ignore the role of age structure.  They do so at significant risk of omitted variable bias.  
Our results show that most of the hypothesized effects appear at a global level of 
aggregation: income and female education reduce fertility while child mortality, rurality, 
and male education raise it.  But the effects are less consistent at the intra-continental 
level, and the variable that shows the most consistent role both within and across 
continents is cohort size. 
 
Finally, we investigate the most important mechanism that is hypothesized to created the 
negative relationship between cohort size and fertility, the positive association between 
cohort size and female economic activity.  To do this, we estimate the following static 
panel equation 
 
it t i it it v RCS far ε µ δ + + + =
− − 34 15
0
34 15  
 
where the dependent variable is the activity rate of females of peak reproductive age, 
which we take to be 15-34, and the independent variable is the share of that age group 
in the working age population aged 15-64.  If the Easterlin/Macunovitch story holds, we 
would expect that large cohort sizes would be associated with higher female activity 
rates.  Our parameter should therefore by positive.  Table 3 shows our results. 
 
Table 3.  RCS and FAR 15-34 
 Asia  Africa  Latin  America  Pooled 










180 250 125 555 
Number of 
countries 
36 50 25 111 
 
The table shows that contrary to the Easterlin/Macunovich implication, larger cohorts 
tend to produce lower activity rates for its females, more in line with the usual cohort 
crowding effects expected of men.  Of course, it is still possible that the cohort crowding 
mechanism still works in another form.  Some economically active women may still have 
sufficient free time to bear children, and crowding may require them to increase their 
economic activity, and lower their fertility.  Thus crowding could promote the intensity of 
female activity and lower fertility without changing the proportion of economically active 
women.  But whether this alternative story is true has yet to be directly verified.  
Thus we find that two tests we perform of the Easterlin/Macunovich mechanism, 
introducing female economic activity in the full specification and testing for a positive 
relationship between cohort size and female economic activity do not yield supportive 
results.  This in fact leads us to an unusual situation: since the most clearly enunciated 
hypothesis for why relative cohort size has an effect on fertility is not strongly supported 
by the data, and since relative cohort size has a strong effect on fertility even after 
accounting for all the traditional determinants of fertility, we find that we as yet do not 
have a sufficient theory that explains the strong association between cohort size and 
fertility.  Relative cohort sizes depress fertility for reasons other than through affecting 
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